With regional opponents deploying sophisticated stealth platforms and India’s indigenous Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) still years away from production, the Indian Air Force (IAF) currently faces a major capability gap in fifth-generation fighter aircraft.
A viable short-term option that might meet this urgent need and offer strategic benefits in terms of cost-effectiveness, manufacturing capacity, and technology transfer is the Russian Su-57E. The effectiveness of the Su-57E as a temporary solution for the IAF while the AMCA reaches full production capacity is investigated in this paper.
As sophisticated fifth-generation jets are deployed around India’s borders, the IAF operates in a security environment that is growing more and more difficult. China’s J-20 stealth fighters have been stationed in high-altitude bases in Tibet; satellite footage shows that six of the aircraft are present at Shigatse airport, which is less than 150 kilometers from the Indian border in Sikkim. There is a notable capability disparity as a result of these deployments, which put China’s most sophisticated operational fighter aircraft within striking reach of Indian territory.
With cutting-edge technologies designed especially for foreign clients, the Su-57E is Russia’s export version of its fifth-generation stealth fighter. With its twin-engine layout and 14,500 kg of thrust produced by each AL-41F1 turbofan engine, the aircraft can cruise at supersonic speeds and reach Mach 2.0+. A combat radius of roughly 1,500 kilometers, a maximum takeoff weight of 35,000 kg, and a cargo capacity of up to 10 kg spanning internal and exterior hard-points are among the operational specifications of the Su-57E.
Internal weapons bays, radar-absorbing materials, and meticulous aerodynamic sculpting all contribute to the aircraft’s stealth features, which include decreased radar, infrared, and visual signals. Independent evaluations, however, indicate that the Su-57’s target radar cross-section is between 0.1 and 1 square meter, which is far more than that of its Western counterparts, the F-22 and F-35, which attain radar cross-sections better than -40 dBsm. This suggests that although the Su-57E has stealth capabilities, they might not be as effective as the top Western designs in terms of low observable performance.
The enhanced electronic warfare capabilities, integrated sensor fusion, and Sh121 AESA radar system are all part of the Su-57E’s avionics suite, which is built to function well in contested electromagnetic settings. The aircraft has 12 hard points, including six internal locations that maintain stealth, which enable it to carry a variety of weaponry, such as precision-guided bombs, air-to-air missiles, and advanced weapons systems. By combining network-centric warfare capabilities with AI-assisted pilot support technologies, the Su-57E is positioned as a cutting-edge vehicle that can conduct contemporary combat operations.
Unprecedented technology transfer clauses set Russia’s Su-57E offer to India apart from other defense procurement agreements. The plan gives India complete access to the aircraft’s source code, allowing it to incorporate domestic weapons systems, tweak software to meet particular operational needs, and customize avionics. India would have a great deal of autonomy in running and improving the platform because to this degree of technology access, which is essentially unrivaled in international fighter aircraft transactions.
The manufacturing plan focuses on HAL’s Nashik facility, which has the infrastructure required for advanced fighter manufacture and proven experience in producing Su-30MKI fighters. With the help of planned enhancements and the facility’s current capabilities, Su-57E production could be supported while taking advantage of similarities with the Super-30 upgrade program for the Su-30MKI fleet. This strategy would use mission computers built in India and GaN-based AESA radar technology, guaranteeing integration with domestic equipment and lowering reliance on outside vendors.
Beyond manufacturing, the technology transfer encompasses weapons integration capabilities, enabling the Su-57E to transport Indian-origin equipment including precision-guided munitions, the Rudram anti-radiation missile, and the Astra beyond-visual-range missile. Through practical operational testing and validation on a cutting-edge platform, this integration capability could expedite the development of indigenous weaponry and is in line with India’s strategic autonomy goals.
With estimated unit costs of $35–40 million per aircraft, the Su-57E offers significant cost benefits over Western options. This is in contrast to the F-35, which has a price tag of $80-110 million. When large-scale procurement requirements are taken into account, this cost difference becomes very significant because purchasing 40-60 Su-57E aircraft would cost roughly $1.4-2.4 billion, whereas purchasing equal F-35 numbers would cost $3.2-6.6 billion. Because of the decreased acquisition cost, the IAF might potentially more effectively meet squadron strength needs by acquiring larger quantity within current budgetary restrictions.
Given India’s preexisting supply chain links and infrastructure for maintaining Russian aircraft, it is anticipated that operational and maintenance costs for the Su-57E will be substantially lower than those of its Western equivalents. Because of the similarities to Su-30MKI systems, pilots would already be familiar with Russian fighter aircraft systems and operations, which would further save training, maintenance, and logistics costs.
Through employment creation, industrial capability development, and technology transfer, the local manufacturing arrangement would result in significant economic benefits. In addition to offering experience pertinent to the AMCA program, HAL’s participation in Su-57E manufacturing would improve India’s aerospace manufacturing skills and foster synergies between short-term purchase and long-term indigenous development goals.
Deploying the Su-57E as a stopgap measure would preserve strategic autonomy in defense procurement while offering instant deterrent capabilities against regional threats. The Su-57E offer features full customization rights and freedom from export control restraints that could limit operational employment, in contrast to Western options that have dependency ties and operational restrictions. In situations where India’s geopolitical interests may differ from those of Western suppliers, this autonomy becomes very valuable.
The operational qualities of the aircraft are in line with the IAF’s needs for multi-role operations and air superiority along its expanding borders with Pakistan and China. The Su-57E would offer major benefits in patrol and interception missions across the great distances required for border security operations due to its super-cruise capability, greater range, and sophisticated sensors. The platform’s capacity to transport both domestic and foreign weaponry systems allows for greater mission planning flexibility and lessens reliance on certain vendors for operational efficacy.
Given the service’s vast knowledge of Russian aircraft technologies, integration with the IAF’s current infrastructure would be very simple. While maintenance and support might expand on existing supply chains and technical know-how, pilot training could take advantage of current connections with Russian training facilities. Compared to implementing completely new Western systems, this operational continuity would save transition costs and speed up capability development.
Since distinct entities would oversee the various programs, the AMCA program would not be delayed or jeopardized by the temporary purchase of Su-57E aircraft. While the ADA continues to develop the AMCA with the intention of involving the private sector through Special Purpose Vehicle arrangements, HAL would manage the manufacturing of the Su-57E in Nashik. By exposing Indian engineers to fifth-generation fighter technologies and giving HAL sophisticated manufacturing knowledge, this parallel strategy may actually help the AMCA program.
The operational expertise obtained from working on Su-57Es could help AMCA with its development needs and offer insightful information about fifth-generation fighter operations in India. Similar integration efforts for the AMCA could be accelerated by lessons acquired from integrating indigenous weaponry and systems with the Su-57E, which could lower development risks and enhance final design results.
Notwithstanding its benefits, the Su-57E has a number of drawbacks that should be taken into account before making a purchase. Although the aircraft has stealth features, they might not be as good as the low-observable performance of top Western designs, which could restrict how effective it is against sophisticated air defense systems. According to independent evaluations, the Su-57 has a far bigger radar cross-section than the F-35 or F-22, which may affect its ability to survive in highly contested airspace.
Russia’s current Su-57 production capacity is still restricted, thus production and delivery schedules are another factor to take into account. While export agreements to Algeria and maybe other clients may affect availability for Indian needs, the domestic Russian program calls for the delivery of 76 aircraft by 2028. Russia’s Komsomolsk-on-Amur production plant would have to expand considerably in order to fulfill sizable Indian requests in a timely manner.
The Su-57E has distinct benefits over alternative possibilities in terms of cost, operational autonomy, and technology transfer. Despite having certain technological advantages, the F-35 has far higher prices, more operational constraints, and less customisation options. Strict export regulations and operational supervision are common features of American offers, which may limit India’s strategic independence in using the aircraft.
It is also necessary to assess the geopolitical risks related to Russian procurement, especially in light of the current international sanctions and any future limitations on the transfer of technology or the supply of replacement parts. Even while India has continued its defense cooperation with Russia in spite of pressure from the West, it is important to carefully assess if such alliances can last in the long run in a world that is becoming more and more divided.
In the end, the Su-57E is a practical answer that strikes a compromise between short-term operational needs and long-term strategic goals. Although it has drawbacks, it gives the IAF a way to obtain significant fifth-generation fighter capabilities at a fair cost and time, giving it crucial deterrence capability in the crucial time before AMCA goes into service. Since national security needs frequently call for workable solutions that fill capability gaps while domestic alternatives develop, the choice should be assessed on the basis of strategic necessity rather than ideological inclinations.
