Ten years of lost chances, poor decision-making, and enduring structural problems, mostly during the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government from 2004 to 2014, are to blame for India’s current fighter jet squadron shortage—an serious defense crisis.
The Indian Air Force (IAF) currently only has between 29 and 31 operating squadrons, far fewer than the 42 that are sanctioned. This leaves the IAF at serious risk from China and Pakistan, whose air forces have recently undergone rapid modernization.
India’s current situation stems from a time of political hesitancy, bureaucratic lethargy, and financial limitations. Only 122 fighters, including 82 Su-30MKI jets, could be entered by the IAF during the UPA’s ten years in power, whereas China and other regional rivals brought in more fighters annually than India did during that time.
This lack of modernization was made worse by institutional reluctance and a generalized fear of being accused of corruption, which caused procurement to wait and be too cautious. For instance, India’s defense minister openly acknowledged in 2014 that the government lacked the money to move on with crucial fighter jet procurement, indicating a high level of strategic vulnerability.
At the heart of the IAF’s decline was the failed Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal. Launched in 2007, it aimed to acquire 126 modern fighters, but spiralled into a seven-year saga characterised by shifting goalposts, contentious negotiations, and deep mistrust.
The Rafale was selected as the winner in 2012 after a rigorous evaluation, but talks stalled on issues of price, technology transfer, and concerns about corruption. The deal ultimately collapsed; instead of 126 jets, India was forced to make an emergency purchase of just 36 Rafales in fly-away condition. The truncated Rafale buy left the fleet modernised only at the margins and did little to reverse the erosion of squadron strength.
India’s efforts at developing an indigenous replacement, the TEJAS, further compounded the crisis. The program, originally launched in the 1980s to replace ageing MiG-21s, has suffered chronic delays, cost overruns, and technical bottlenecks, many stemming from shifting requirements and inadequate project management.
As of 2025, delivery deadlines for the improved TEJAS MK-1A variant have slipped repeatedly, hampered by late engine shipments from GE Aerospace and evolving Air Force specifications that forced continual redesigns. Despite achieving operational clearance for TEJAS Mk-1, the inability to ramp up timely production left a gap that indigenous development alone could not fill.
India still depends heavily on imports, particularly from Russia, but these agreements haven’t resulted in strong domestic capabilities. Inadequate offset provisions and inadequate technology transfer agreements led to no significant improvement in local aerospace competence, even during the height of imports, which reached about $4 billion yearly in 2013–2014. Despite efforts at domestic production, the IAF’s mainstay, the Su-30MKI, still depends on Russian parts and assistance. Though production and induction are still years away, efforts to localize or co-produce advanced jets—like the most recent offers for the Su-57E fifth-generation fighter—have only recently started to fit with India’s “self-reliance” objectives.
India now only possesses 29–31 fighter squadrons, far fewer than the minimum of 42 authorized for credible two-front deterrence, as of 2025. With 66 squadrons, China is far ahead of Pakistan, which has about 25 squadrons.
There are significant gaps in India’s air combat capability since far too many of its fighters are outdated aircraft (MiG-21s, Jaguars, and Mirages) that are past their retirement date.
Significant delays and missed choices occurred in important procurements during the UPA government’s decade from 2004 to 2014, most notably the Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) contract.
The MMRCA agreement, which was started in the middle of the 2000s to acquire 126 contemporary fighters, fell through after Rafale was chosen because of unsuccessful discussions between Dassault, the company that makes Rafale, and Indian state-run HAL regarding pricing, production duties, quality assurances, and knowledge transfer.
Politics was unable to break the impasse since HAL was unable to deliver the necessary assurances on manufacturing quality, and costs threatened to rise. Final discussions were abruptly stopped in 2013 due to last-minute government involvement.
Years later, only 36 Rafales—instead of the 126 that were initially planned—were shipped straight from France, creating a huge deficit.
Although the UPA did invest almost $30 billion in a variety of foreign equipment, including Sukhoi-30MKIs, and negotiate some significant arms deals, the emphasis mostly eschewed modernizing the fighter fleet in favor of other platforms.
Slow decision-making, a lack of private sector collaborations, and engine supply interruptions beset India’s domestic Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) TEJAS program. Decades after the project began, the first flight occurred. Induction timings were more than a year behind schedule in recent years as a result of additional delays brought on by worldwide engine supply problems.
Only a small number of TEJAS Mk1A jets have been delivered to the Air Force as late as mid-2025, demonstrating the production agencies’ inability to steadily increase output. HAL was unable to quickly replace aging Russian aircraft due to inadequate domestic design and engine manufacturing capabilities.
Weak technology transfer and offset provisions were present in several defense import contracts, particularly with Russia, which hindered India’s capacity to develop and maintain its own next-generation aircraft.
Although there was success in the UPA’s efforts to involve the private sector in defense manufacture, the base was too small to quickly and extensively indigenize output.
India hurried a direct Rafale government-to-government import after the failed MMRCA deal, but this fell well short of what was required to make up numbers or provide the whole air arm with next-generation capabilities.
India hurried a direct Rafale government-to-government import after the failed MMRCA deal, but this fell well short of what was required to make up numbers or provide the whole air arm with next-generation capabilities.
India’s Air Force still has a long way to go; in order to stabilize squadron strength, it must induct at least 40 fighters annually, which is beyond the capacity of present domestic and international supply.
This lost decade and the glacial pace that followed have led to a continuous and widening disparity in air force between China and, increasingly, Pakistan.
Today’s pressing calls for both domestic and cooperative foreign procurement are clear reminders of this “lost decade.” India is negotiating new large-scale multi-role fighter acquisitions (MRFA), expediting the domestic TEJAS program, and making emergency purchases. Even in the best-case scenario, however, analysts predict that it will take at least another ten years to reach the authorized 42 squadrons. By 2035, if all ongoing projects are completed without additional delay, optimistic estimates place the achievable aim at 35 to 36 squadrons.
A protracted period of poor choices, unsuccessful strategies, and administrative inertia, combined with sluggish domestic development and under-leveraged imports, has resulted in India’s fighter squadron issue. Even though there is now a renewed sense of urgency and changes, the harm caused by the lost decade nevertheless has a lasting impact on air combat readiness and national security.
