The dynamic threat picture that contemporary missile defense systems must contend with has been illustrated by recent Iranian ballistic missile launches against Israel. Critical flaws in modern missile defense architectures are highlighted by Iran’s deployment of about 300 ballistic missiles in several waves, the majority of which reportedly managed to breach Israeli air defenses despite the nation’s sophisticated multi-layered defenses.
Even with Israel’s advanced multi-layered defense system, which includes the David’s Sling, Iron Dome, and Arrow systems, a number of missiles managed to get past air defenses and hit residential areas in Ramat Gan, Tel Aviv, and other vital places. The Israeli Defense Forces admitted that although the majority of the missiles were intercepted at rates comparable to earlier strikes, dozens were purposefully left to hit open regions in order to save interceptors, underscoring the difficulties in managing resources when defending against saturation attacks.
Given China’s far larger ballistic missile arsenal—which is projected to contain around 1,300 Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), 500 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and extensive Short-Range Ballistic Missile (SRBM) capabilities—this analysis becomes very pertinent for India. India’s strategic priority is to create all-encompassing defenses against possible Chinese saturation attacks, which have the capacity to overcome present defenses due to their sheer volume and intricate coordination.
While India’s present SRBM and MRBM inventory lacks the similar range to effectively strike Chinese installations, China’s strategic posture along the Tibetan plateau enables DF-21 missiles to reach Delhi and heavily populated areas of northern India. Advanced decoy systems and the use of Multiple Independently-targetable Re-Entry Vehicles (MIRVs) make interception situations even more difficult and may even surpass current defense capabilities.
The two-tiered architecture of India’s current Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Phase-I system, which can intercept missiles up to 2,000 km in range, consists of Advanced Air Defence (AAD) for engagement at lower altitudes and Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) for high-altitude interception. The AAD successfully destroyed a medium-range ballistic missile target in August 2018 in the presence of numerous electronically simulated dummy warheads, demonstrating the system’s successful interception capabilities in controlled testing environments. However, the system encounters significant scalability challenges when facing large-scale saturation attacks. There are still not enough interceptor missiles in the current stockpile to handle the number of inbound threats that China may launch in a concerted attack.
For detection, tracking, and guiding, India’s BMD network mostly depends on the Multifunction Fire Control Radar and Swordfish long-range tracking radar systems. However, when dealing with several objects at once, the existing radar design shows significant gaps in coverage and processing power. Even while the current command and control architecture uses technology from the Arrow system, which was developed in Israel, it does not have the distributed processing capacity required to handle hundreds of incoming threats at once. Through targeted attacks or electronic warfare, enemies could take advantage of the possible single points of failure created by the centralized Mission Control Center system.
A major change toward distributed sensor systems that can offer extensive coverage while preserving operational resilience is necessary to improve India’s BMD capabilities. To improve observation and tracking of ballistic and air-breathing threats, current systems should be complemented by a distributed air and missile defense layer built on smaller, less expensive radars. In order to increase coverage, especially against low-flying threats, these smaller, movable land- and sea-based radars can be deployed in larger numbers. They can also work together to give coverage that is comparable to that of large, fixed-site radars. A feasible foundation for growing India’s radar network is provided by the deployment of the Distributed Imaging Radar Technology (DIRT) program concept, which creates technology to continually detect and identify moving and stationary battlefield targets using distributed platforms.
An essential force multiplier for handling saturation strikes is the use of artificial intelligence into India’s BMD system. Through real-time target identification and engagement coordination, India’s Akashteer system successfully thwarted Pakistani drone and missile attacks, showcasing the potential of AI-powered automated air defense. Scaling defensive capabilities is made possible by the system’s capacity to integrate several radar systems, sensors, and communication technologies into a unified operational framework and automate the detection, tracking, and engagement of enemy aircraft, drones, and missiles. By speeding up threat prioritization, trajectory prediction, and interceptor allocation decisions, advanced AI systems can drastically cut down on kill chain execution time-frames.
In order to handle many threat situations at once, modern missile defense systems must advance beyond single-target engagement paradigms. Saturation attacks present complicated threat situations that need the development of sophisticated multiple sensor, multiple target tracking algorithms. Advanced assignment algorithms that can interpret tracking data from dispersed sensor networks and maintain accuracy throughout multiple concurrent engagements must be incorporated into these systems. By using machine learning algorithms, threat assessment and engagement tactics can be continuously improved based on past experiences.
To counter possible Chinese saturation strike scenarios, India’s interceptor missile stock needs to be significantly increased. According to the Indian Air Force, present inventory levels are still insufficient for complicated, saturated attack scenarios, even if existing systems are more capable than Iron Dome-like systems. The foundation for increasing defensive capability is provided by the development of the Akash NG system, which has improved accuracy, range, and capabilities. Longer-range threats are addressed by the BMD Phase-II program, which calls for faster development and deployment of AD-1 and AD-2 interceptors, which are intended to attack intermediate-range ballistic missiles and ICBMs with ranges up to 5,000 km.
The most pressing need is to increase the number of interceptor missiles in India’s stockpile by speeding up the manufacturing of current systems and increasing the density of the radar network by deploying more mobile radar units. For crucial defensive zones, the integration of AI-powered target tracking and engagement systems built on the Akashteer framework have to be given top priority. Network-centric operations fundamentally demand upgrading communication infrastructure to facilitate high-speed data transfer between defensive elements.
Providing thorough protection against intermediate and long-range ballistic missile threats should be the main goal of BMD Phase-II development and deployment. To achieve operational deployment, DRDO and industry partners must coordinate the establishment of distributed radar networks with counter-stealth capabilities. The creation of countermeasures against hypersonic threats, which may include glide-phase interceptors, tackles new threat types that traditional systems are unable to handle.
The ultimate goal for India’s defensive architecture is the development of fully integrated, AI-enabled missile defense networks that can independently analyze threats and coordinate engagements. Comprehensive tracking capabilities from the boost phase until terminal engagement are made possible by the integration of space-based sensors with ground-based technologies. In addition to addressing the most sophisticated threat categories, the creation of domestic hypersonic interceptor systems guarantees technological sovereignty.
Recent conflict dynamics, especially the Iranian saturation assaults on Israel and, more significantly, the swarm drone attacks by Pakistan during Operation Sindoor, have made it clear that India needs to improve its ballistic missile defense capabilities.
It is both a technological difficulty and a strategic need that India’s BMD architecture be changed from its current two-tier system to a complete, distributed, AI-enabled network. Expanding interceptor inventories, establishing dispersed radar networks, incorporating artificial intelligence for automated engagement, and creating specialized capabilities against new threats like stealth and hypersonic weapons are all areas that must be developed in concert for this endeavor to be successful.
In order to ensure that India maintains credible defensive capabilities against changing threat scenarios and progresses toward next-generation defensive architectures that can handle future challenges, the implementation timeline must strike a balance between immediate operational needs and long-term technological development. The experiences acquired from recent conflicts show that passive defensive postures are not enough; proactive, intelligent, and flexible systems that can change with the threat environment are necessary for modern missile defense.
