The calculus of contemporary combat has been drastically changed by the quick development of drone warfare, as demonstrated by Ukraine’s recent Operation Spider’s Web against Russia. In order to cause billions of dollars’ worth of damage to Russian strategic bombers without endangering any pilots, Ukraine used swarms of inexpensive, remotely operated drones.
A crucial lesson for India is highlighted by this spectacular display of asymmetric power: drones are no longer only auxiliary weapons; they are now essential to both offensive and defensive tactics in conflict.
Given that China and Pakistan, two technologically advanced enemies, are increasingly incorporating drones into their military doctrines, India’s security environment is particularly precarious.
While Pakistan has utilized drones for surveillance, arms smuggling, and even direct attacks on Indian airbases, China has already placed drone swarms in Eastern Ladakh. Due to the fact that several Indian airbases in Leh, Srinagar, Pathankot, and Ambala do not have Next-Generation Hardened Aircraft Shelters (NGHAS), costly assets are left vulnerable to inexpensive, disposable drones.
India’s drone capabilities are still dispersed throughout the Army, Air Force, and Navy, despite advancements in procuring cutting-edge platforms like the MQ-9B Predator and creating domestic UAVs like Rustom-II and Archer-NG. The Air Force has leased several sophisticated drones but lacks swarm or loitering munition capabilities, the Army mostly employs drones for reconnaissance, and the Navy’s efforts are still in the experimental stage. This disorganized strategy emphasizes the urgent need for unified leadership, ideology, and resource allocation and is reminiscent of Russia’s early mistakes in Ukraine.
India’s drone capabilities would be unified and improved by a dedicated Drone Command, which is being suggested as the Indian Unmanned Systems Command (IN-USC) and would be under the Chief of Defence Staff.
deploying FPV drones, loitering weapons, and Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) for direct action and assistance.
Integrating electronic warfare teams, laser-based interceptors, and radar jamming units to defend critical infrastructure.
India must also invest in a Drone Warfare Academy to teach a new generation of electronic warfare experts, AI swarm strategists, and combat drone pilots in order to facilitate this transition. This academy would combine technical, tactical, and ethical training in partnership with top academic and defense organizations, taking inspiration from Ukraine’s recruitment of gamers and FPV racing champions.
It is equally important to build indigenous capacity at scale. The emphasis needs to change to mass-producing inexpensive FPV and swarm drones, creating stealthy autonomous UCAVs like the Ghatak, and deploying cutting-edge anti-drone systems like DRDO’s Smart Anti-Airfield Weapon (SAAW) and laser interceptors. Companies like ideaForge, Tata Advanced Systems, and NewSpace are emerging leaders in this space. To acquire more than 10,000 drones, construct more than 100 reinforced shelters, and establish training simulators, forward drone bases, and combat labs, a capital investment of ₹50,000 crore over five years is required.
In conclusion, the battlefield in Ukraine has sent a clear message: drones will determine how future conflicts turn out. It is not acceptable for India to fall behind. Creating a specialized Drone Command that is adequately manned, funded, and led by domestic creativity is not only a necessary but also an evolutionary step. The new battlefield is the sky, and who controls it will decide who wins the conflicts of the future. The sky is no longer the boundary.
Why India Must Establish A Unified Drone Command To Secure Its Skies And Future Wars
