Can The IAF Fill The Widening Air Defense Gap In India’s Stealth Fighter Race?

India’s air supremacy and deterrent capabilities are seriously threatened by the growing stealth fighter gap between it and its regional rivals. India is at a turning point in the evolution of its military aircraft as China quickly grows its fifth-generation fleet and the United States introduces its sixth-generation fighter.

In light of the revolutionary developments in aerial combat, this research looks at India’s current standing in the quest for stealth fighters, the development of its domestic Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) program, and possible avenues for bridging the technological divide.

The gap between India’s stealth fighter capabilities and those of its regional competitors is becoming more and more alarming. Vijainder K. Thakur, a retired Indian Air Force (IAF) Jaguar pilot, has issued a warning regarding the possibility that by 2030, China may increase its fleet of J-20 aircraft to nearly 400, while Pakistan may have two squadrons (about 40 aircraft) of J-35A stealth fighters. Given that India is unlikely to have any operational stealth fighters by that time, this glaring discrepancy is all the more concerning.

It is impossible to overestimate the technical advantage that stealth aircraft provide. Due to their drastically smaller radar cross-sections, these fifth-generation systems are very challenging to identify and follow using traditional methods. Additionally, they have the ability to launch sophisticated air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles that are undetectable by conventional radar systems, which might destroy Indian defenses before they even recognize an approaching danger. This capacity generates a significant deterrent gap and radically changes the dynamics of aerial warfare.

Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh publicly evaluated this technical gap in October 2024, admitting that the IAF has lagged behind China in several important areas, like as defense equipment manufacturing rates and technological advancement. Given the continuing border tensions, this statement underscores the growing disparity between India’s air strength and that of its northern neighbor, which is a worrying truth.

In recent years, there has been a significant change in the worldwide fighter aircraft scene. Fifth-generation fighters brought revolutionary stealth capabilities and sensor fusion technology, whereas fourth-generation fighters, such as America’s F-16 and Russia’s Su-30MKI, dominated late 20th-century battles with their maneuverability and hefty armament loads. The “first look, first kill” capacity of these developments has made traditional air warfare strategies all but useless, enabling pilots to destroy hostile aircraft before they can react.

With the recent introduction of its sixth-generation fighter, the Boeing F-47, as part of the Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) program, the United States has further expedited this progression. This platform, which was unveiled by President Trump, integrates cutting-edge technology like as sophisticated propulsion systems, improved stealth capabilities, and artificial intelligence. At the same time, China is still mass-producing its fifth-generation J-20 fighters while also testing sixth-generation J-36 prototypes, which were presented in December 2024.

The ambitious in-house Indian endeavor to create a fifth-generation stealth fighter is embodied in the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft. Despite providing a possible route to technical parity, the initiative has encountered several obstacles that have slowed its advancement.

The AMCA Phase-I, which will use the GE-F414 engine, may make its first flight within seven years of obtaining Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) approval, with the first induction maybe taking place ten years later, according to DRDO Chief Dr. Samir V. Kamat. This timetable is an update to previous, more optimistic forecasts. According to the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), the nodal agency for AMCA development, the first flight is scheduled for 2028–2029, with induction taking place in the 2030s.

These estimates, however, are contingent upon obtaining the required financing and permissions. Although the design phase is over, the DRDO has requested about ₹15,000 crore for development expenditures and is currently seeking CCS approval. The project’s advancement is now seriously hampered by this delay in obtaining the required funding.

According to some program insiders, Dr. Kamat’s seven-year projection may be purposefully cautious in order to deflect criticism in the event of delays. According to these reports, the maiden flight may take place as early as 2028, or four years following CCS certification. This more hopeful schedule, meanwhile, is still contingent upon obtaining the critical CCS approval, which has not yet been granted.

The AMCA will probably not go into service until the mid-2030s at the latest, even with expedited development. This would leave a sizable capability gap at a time when both China and Pakistan will be using stealth platforms in sizable quantities. For Indian air defense, this timeframe discrepancy poses a strategic risk that has to be fixed.

While the AMCA program moves forward, India is investigating a number of strategies to strengthen its air force because it understands how urgent it is to close the stealth capability gap.

During Prime Minister Modi’s February 2025 visit to the United States, President Trump made a big diplomatic offer to India: the F-35 stealth fighter. The F-35 was previously only available to NATO members and a few important partners, so this offer might be a turning point. India would have instant access to tested fifth-generation technologies if it were to acquire this platform.

At the same time, Russia has suggested that India co-produce the Su-57E fighter. This option would provide India access to cutting-edge stealth capabilities while strengthening its long-standing defense partnership with Russia. Both choices, meanwhile, entail significant monetary outlays as well as possible geopolitical issues that need to be properly considered.

To expedite the development and introduction of the AMCA, a high-level team headed by Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh is presently working to finalize a workable manufacturing model. By the end of April 2025, this committee—which consists of IAF Vice-Chief Air Marshal SP Dharkar, Secretary of Defence Production Sanjeev Kumar, and leading experts from the ADA and DRDO—should have its proposals ready.

To expedite the development and introduction of the AMCA, a high-level team headed by Defence Secretary Rajesh Kumar Singh is presently working to finalize a workable manufacturing model. By the end of April 2025, this committee—which consists of IAF Vice-Chief Air Marshal SP Dharkar, Secretary of Defence Production Sanjeev Kumar, and leading experts from the ADA and DRDO—should have its proposals ready.

Maximizing the potential of India’s indigenous fighter program requires prioritizing crucial technology development, streamlining bureaucratic procedures, and guaranteeing timely financing. The committee’s suggestions will probably influence how the AMCA project develops in the future and establish if India can indeed close the stealth capability gap.

India’s strategic stance in the area and its capacity to dissuade possible enemies are significantly impacted by the stealth fighter deficit.

Impact on Conventional Deterrence: Given India’s geopolitical position with continuous tensions with both China and Pakistan, the technology gap in stealth capabilities seriously compromises India’s conventional deterrence. Stealth jets have the ability to enter guarded airspace, hit valuable targets with precision attacks, and slip away before defensive systems can react. The strategic equilibrium is shifted by this capacity, which may also give opponents the confidence to adopt more aggressive stances.

According to Thakur, this growing gap might seriously impair India’s military deterrent capabilities and lead to a risky imbalance in the balance of power in the area. One significant weakness that has to be addressed by both technology improvement and strategic adaptation is the ability of stealth platforms to operate against non-stealth defenses with almost complete impunity.

Force Structure Issues: In addition to the technology divide, the IAF has serious force structure issues that exacerbate the stealth discrepancy. The IAF is already operating below its authorized capacity, with about 30 squadrons out of a sanctioned total of 42. Without significant acquisition efforts, this deficit might grow much larger as at least eight additional squadrons are scheduled to retire during the next ten years.

To overcome these shortages, Air Chief Marshal A.P. Singh has emphasized the necessity of adding 35–40 fighter planes each year. Reaching the authorized strength and eventually scaling up to 60 squadrons by 2047 is the long-term target; yet, accomplishing this challenging objective necessitates concurrently correcting both numeric deficiencies and qualitative drawbacks.

A diversified strategy that strikes a balance between immediate capability improvement and long-term domestic development is needed to close India’s stealth fighter deficit.

Accelerate CCS Approval for AMCA: By expediting the AMCA program’s approval process, development work may start in earnest and the period to first flight and ultimate service entrance might be shortened.

Think About Interim Stealth Acquisition: India should carefully consider the proposals from the US and Russia to see whether acquiring foreign stealth jets may serve as a stopgap capability while the AMCA is being developed.

Boost Counter-Stealth Capabilities: The advantage of enemy stealth platforms may be somewhat offset by investing in sophisticated radar systems, passive detection technologies, and integrated air defense networks.

Increase Domestic Production Capacity: Maintaining present modernization initiatives and upcoming indigenous platforms will need the development of strong domestic manufacturing capabilities for cutting-edge aerospace components.

Public-business Partnership Model: By putting in place a productive model of cooperation between academic institutions, the business sector, and defense-related public sector initiatives, technical advancement and manufacturing capacity might be accelerated.

Emphasis on Critical Technologies: India’s aerospace ecosystem will be strengthened by giving top priority to the development of important enabling technologies including sophisticated avionics, innovative radar-absorbent materials, and domestic engine technology.

Bilateral Technology Cooperation: India’s growth timetable might be accelerated while establishing beneficial international ties by pursuing strategic alliances with countries ready to exchange cutting-edge aeronautical technologies.

Closing the stealth fighter gap with its regional rivals is a significant task for India. India’s air dominance and conventional deterrence capabilities are at risk due to a confluence of factors, including opponent advances, delayed indigenous development, and deficiencies in the current force structure.

The AMCA program is a viable long-term answer, but because of its lengthy schedule, India will need to take several different approaches to close the capability gap. This might involve improved counter-stealth capabilities, expedited domestic development, and short-term overseas acquisitions. India’s aerial combat capabilities will be shaped for decades to come by the choices taken in the upcoming months, especially with reference to the AMCA’s manufacturing model and possible foreign acquisition.

India needs to take quick action to reduce the stealth gap before it gets much wider. This is the evident strategic necessity. Maintaining technical parity has become not only beneficial but also crucial for national security since the nature of aerial combat continues to change at an unprecedented rate. India must figure out how to deploy stealth capabilities that can fend off the rising danger presented by opponent fifth- and sixth-generation systems, whether that is done through domestic development, purchase from outside, or a mix of strategies.