In 2025, Operation Sindoor marked a turning point in South Asian maritime security by revealing the declining capabilities of Pakistan’s submarines and showcasing India’s increasing naval power in the Arabian Sea. Significant ramifications for regional peace and the balance of maritime power in the Indo-Pacific were caused by the operation, which exposed structural weaknesses in Pakistan’s ability to conduct underwater warfare, ranging from deficiencies in operational preparedness to shortcomings in strategic deterrence.
An armada of 36 ships, according to sources, successfully blockaded Pakistan’s main naval base in Karachi as part of Operation Sindoor, an unparalleled display of India’s naval might. This enormous naval deployment demonstrated the remarkable growth of India’s maritime projection capabilities over the previous 50 years and stood in sharp contrast to the small six-warship operation carried out during the 1971 conflict. With eight to ten warships forward deployed into the Arabian Sea, the Carrier Battle Group INS Vikrant was at the center of this operation, which was one of the Indian Navy’s largest real-time operational maneuvers outside of regular peacetime drills.
With seven destroyers armed with BrahMos missiles, Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missiles (MRSAM), and Varunastra heavyweight torpedoes that could combat surface, airborne, and undersea threats, the operation’s composition showcased India’s all-encompassing approach to maritime warfare. An estimated six submarines worked in tight coordination below the surface, adding a crucial stealth element to India’s maritime posture, while seven stealth guided-missile frigates, including the recently inducted INS Tushil, established a formidable naval wall off the western coast. After a terror incident in Pahalgam, Jammu and Kashmir, left 26 people dead, India launched a three-pronged pressure campaign on Pakistan, which put the Navy on high alert and sparked the operation.
Beyond its immediate tactical goals, Operation Sindoor has strategic significance since it has radically changed Pakistan’s opinion of India’s naval prowess and willingness to project power in disputed waters. In response to concerns about a potential naval attack, Pakistan issued NAVAREA warnings, proving that India could exert persistent maritime pressure and that the operation was successful in generating strategic ambiguity. The size and complexity of the deployment demonstrated how India has developed into a blue-water navy that can carry out intricate multi-domain operations far from its territorial seas.
The most concerning finding from Operation Sindoor relates to the terrible condition of Pakistan’s submarine fleet, since satellite footage from March 2025 shows significant operating constraints that seriously jeopardize the nation’s ability to repel maritime threats. Only two of Pakistan’s five operational submarines—an Agosta-70 class vessel and an Agosta-90B class submarine—remain operational, according to recent assessments; the other three are either undergoing extensive maintenance or are stranded on land for repairs. At a time when regional tensions have escalated to previously unheard-of heights, Pakistan’s underwater warfare capabilities have catastrophically declined due to this drastic drop in operational capacity.
PNS Hashmat and PNS Hurmat, two Agosta-70 class submarines that were put into service between 1979 and 1980, are essentially useless due to deteriorating infrastructure and major technical issues. According to reports, PNS Hurmat is no longer in operational mode due to a malfunctioning starboard engine and electronic warfare equipment. Turkey’s STM business is undertaking massive mid-life upgrades for the Agosta-90B class submarines, PNS Khalid, PNS Saad, and PNS Hamza, which were commissioned between 1999 and 2008. However, supply-chain bottlenecks and funding constraints are causing these modernization activities to be significantly delayed.
Comprehensive overhauls of sonar suites, periscopes, command and control systems, naval data distribution systems, converters, steering control systems, chilled water systems, radar and electronic support systems, and more are all part of the Agosta-90B class submarine modernization program. Even though STM delivered the second submarine, PNS Khalid, in 2023 and finished modernizing PNS Hamza in 2020, the remaining submarines are still undergoing major repairs. Pakistan’s submarine fleet is currently operating at less than half its nominal capacity during a time of increased strategic tensions due to the lengthy nature of these maintenance cycles and the intricate technical requirements for upgrading MESMA air-independent propulsion systems.
The operation also raised questions about Pakistan’s capabilities to launch a nuclear second strike. Analysts question the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile’s operational integration and effective range, despite the fact that it is hailed as a crucial component. This undermines trust in Pakistan’s strategic deterrence stance. These worries are exacerbated by Pakistan’s diesel-electric submarines’ short underwater endurance when compared to their nuclear-powered rivals.
In addition to exposing operational and technical flaws, Operation Sindoor also showed Pakistan’s attempts to inflate its naval readiness using old film and Photoshopped photos. These assertions were refuted by open source intelligence, seriously undermining Pakistan’s military communications’ credibility and casting doubt on the veracity of its claimed capabilities.
Pakistan’s nuclear deterrence strategy is significantly impacted by the submarine crisis, especially in regards to the legitimacy of its second-strike capabilities using ballistic missiles launched from submarines. With an operational range of 450 kilometers, the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile has been marketed by the Pakistan Navy as a key component of its strategic deterrence. Independent analysts, however, dispute these assertions, arguing that the missile’s effective operational range is closer to 250 kilometers, severely reducing its strategic usefulness against targets in inland India and jeopardizing Pakistan’s deterrence posture.
Severe financial limitations that restrict Pakistan’s capacity to both modernize its fleet and preserve current capabilities are at the heart of the country’s submarine issue. Lack of foreign cash and mounting external debt have repeatedly delayed Karachi Shipyard’s construction, interfering with planned submarine inductions and seriously limiting the advancement of more comprehensive maritime capabilities.
Pakistan’s submarine fleet faces technological difficulties that expose serious deficiencies in domestic capabilities and an excessive dependence on technology transfers from other sources, which leads to strategic weaknesses. Pakistan has been unable to sustain the ongoing investment in research and development infrastructure necessary to meet the complexity of contemporary submarine systems, which range from sophisticated sonar arrays to air-independent propulsion technology. The advanced MESMA air-independent propulsion systems found in Pakistan’s Agosta-90B submarines call on specialized supply chains and maintenance skills that are difficult for Pakistan to provide on its own.
Turkey’s STM company’s modernization initiatives demonstrate the advantages of global collaboration as well as the drawbacks of relying on outside partners for vital military capabilities. Even though the extensive upgrade program covers a number of systems at once, such as periscopes, sonar suites, command and control systems, and electronic warfare capabilities, the length of time and intricacy of these changes highlight the difficulties in preserving technological relevance in quickly changing submarine warfare environments. While maintaining safety and reliability standards, modernization efforts are made more difficult and expensive by the certification requirements of international classification bodies like as DNV.
In order to escape the cycle of vulnerability and dependence that defines current operations, Pakistan will need to build up its own support capabilities for future submarine programs, notably the Hangor-class vessels. Although the Hangor contract’s transfer-of-technology clauses offer a chance to develop domestic submarine building and maintenance capabilities, achieving these advantages will necessitate ongoing investments in technical education, supply chain management, and infrastructure development that may be beyond Pakistan’s current institutional and financial capabilities.
Operation Sindoor has demonstrated India’s increasing maritime superiority in South Asian waterways while exposing Pakistan’s submarine fleet’s serious weaknesses. At a time of increased regional tensions, the discovery that only two of Pakistan’s five submarines are still in service poses a strategic threat to the nation’s naval deterrence and second-strike capabilities. Pakistan’s marine security is at risk for the rest of this decade due to a confluence of factors, including aging platforms, prolonged maintenance cycles, budgetary limitations, and delays in modernization initiatives.
The wider ramifications of this submarine crisis go well beyond the bilateral relationship between India and Pakistan; they also have the potential to alter regional power structures and strategic alliances across the Indo-Pacific. India’s proven naval dominance has improved its standing with important allies while highlighting Pakistan’s strategic weaknesses and the limitations of China’s defense exports. According to the financial and technological obstacles Pakistan’s submarine modernization efforts face, these capability gaps are expected to last well into the 2030s, radically shifting the maritime power dynamics in the region and opening up new avenues for improved collaboration between India and its strategic allies in preserving Indo-Pacific security.