Former CIA counterproliferation officer Richard Barlow has made startling revelations about Washington’s complicity in enabling Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions during the 1980s. Speaking to ANI, Barlow stated that successive US Presidents consciously certified Islamabad as non-nuclear despite clear intelligence proving otherwise.
He revealed that the CIA had knowledge by the late 1980s that Pakistan possessed deployable nuclear weapons which were capable of being mounted on American-supplied F-16 fighter jets. “We knew all about the Pakistani nuclear weapons design, and we knew all about the F-16s… they were capable of delivering the Pakistani nuclear weapons as they existed at that time, without any doubt,” he said.
Barlow’s testimony sheds light on a period when political expedience outweighed non-proliferation commitments. According to him, the Reagan and Bush administrations concealed Pakistan’s nuclear activities to maintain Islamabad’s support during the Soviet-Afghan War.
Throughout the 1980s, Washington continued to certify Pakistan’s compliance under the Pressler Amendment, a law requiring annual presidential confirmation that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear device to retain US aid.
He explained that despite the CIA’s unease, elected officials decided to push forward with arms deliveries for geopolitical reasons. “All we can do is present the intelligence to the elected leaders… what they choose to do after that is not our place,” Barlow noted.
Seymour Hersh’s 1993 report in The New Yorker corroborated these concerns, documenting how US satellites detected Pakistan moving nuclear weapons to airbases where F-16s were stationed. These findings contradicted US government certifications at the time.
The 1987 Brasstacks Crisis
The episode coincided with one of South Asia’s most dangerous nuclear standoffs. During India’s massive military exercise, Operation Brasstacks (1986–87), Pakistan perceived the manoeuvre as an invasion rehearsal. Barlow recounted that during this crisis, Islamabad had already successfully assembled nuclear weapons. Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan even confirmed as much in a 1987 media interview, stating that the bomb existed as a deterrent against India.
Barlow insisted that the intelligence community observed the movement of nuclear weapons and delivery platforms during that period. “The nuclear weapons that Pakistan was said not to possess were being mated with F-16s,” he added.
The 1990 Nuclear Crisis
US authorities eventually halted the certification process in 1990 after Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan. By then, Washington’s strategic priorities had changed, and officials could no longer deny Islamabad’s nuclear status. President George H. W. Bush dispatched Defence Secretary Robert Gates to defuse the rising tension between India and Pakistan, which Barlow termed “the most dangerous crisis since the Cuban missile crisis.”
Comparing that standoff to recent tensions during Operation Sindoor, he remarked that the 1990 scenario was far more volatile due to weak command and control systems and the limited number of warheads, increasing the likelihood of miscalculation.
Barlow also said that at the time, US intelligence assessments found that the Pakistani Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, had little control over the nuclear programme, which was dominated by the military leadership under General Mirza Aslam Beg and President Ghulam Ishaq Khan.
Policy Deception And Suppression
Barlow claimed that during his tenure at the CIA and later the Pentagon, he discovered senior officials in both the State Department and the CIA had misled Congress about Pakistan’s nuclear procurement activities. When he refused to alter his assessments to downplay Islamabad’s progress or soften the findings in his reports to the National Security Council, he faced retaliation, the suspension of his security clearance, and eventually termination.
He revealed that his Pentagon superior, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defence Edward Gnehm (nicknamed “Skip”), had tasked him with compiling a comprehensive review of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, including its delivery capabilities and aerospace adaptations for the F-16s. However, regional officers attempted to pressure him into revising his findings. “They wanted me to change my report, but my analysis was consistent with the CIA’s conclusions,” he stated.
Fallout And Aftermath
In the aftermath of his whistleblowing, Barlow’s allegations were later investigated and deemed credible by the State Department’s Inspector General. His case symbolised institutional efforts to suppress intelligence that contradicted Washington’s foreign policy interests during the Cold War.
Reflecting on that period, Barlow said that the deception persisted even after the Soviet withdrawal because vested interests were reluctant to terminate aid and military collaboration with Pakistan. “There were still people in the US government who wanted to certify under the Pressler Amendment, even after nuclear weapons had been fielded. They were having collective panic because they knew the aid would end,” he recalled.
Barlow concluded that while Pakistan has since developed more advanced delivery systems and expanded its arsenal, the earlier decades were far riskier. The absence of strong nuclear command structures and the secrecy enveloping the arsenal made the 1980s and early 1990s one of the most precarious eras for South Asian nuclear stability.
Based On ANI Report
