While there was never any doubt that Rawalpindi is continuing with its proxy war in J&K, recent events indicate a planned escalation in terrorist activities, both in terms of scope and intensity. On the intervening night of February 4/5, an intended terrorist attack in the Krishna Ghati (KG) Sector of J&K’s Poonch district failed when a landmine explosion caused an unspecified number of casualties to members of Pakistan army’s ‘Border Action Team’ (BAT) comprising regular soldiers and terrorists while they were attempting to cross the Line of Control (LoC).
On February 10, an Indian army soldier in the Nowshera Sector of J&K’s Rajauri district sustained gunshot injuries due to firing from across the LoC. The next day, an Indian army officer and a soldier who were part of a patrol along the LoC in Akhnoor district of J&K were killed in an improvised explosive device (IED) blast. Just a day later, Pakistani troops violated the ceasefire agreement by carrying out unprovoked firing on Indian army posts in KG Sector, which evoked a befitting response from the Indian side. Though neither side mentioned anything about this incident, the Pakistan army has (according to reliable sources), suffered significant losses.
On February 14, sniper fire from across the Line of Control wounded an Indian army soldier in the Akhnoor district’s Battal region. Two days later, an Indian army position in the Poonch district’s Gulpur Sector was fired upon from a wooded area over the Line of Control, although no one was hurt. Although brief, the Indian army’s retaliation for this provocative behavior was fierce and seems to have been successful because the Pakistani army hasn’t engaged in such stunts since.
It’s no accident that two potent IEDs were found in South Kashmir’s Shopian and Pulwama districts on Tuesday. It explicitly points at a deliberate effort by the Pakistan army’s spy agency Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), which is masterminding terrorism in J&K in
In addition to increasing the amount of bloodshed, it seems that ISI has instructed its sponsored terrorists in J&K to terrorize residents in order to create an aberrant atmosphere in the hinterland. This is demonstrated by the fact that on February 3, in the South Kashmiri region of Kulgam, terrorists killed a retired army veteran and wounded his wife and niece. Since the bodies of two locals who had been strangled were discovered in the Kathua district on February 16, authorities have not ruled out the possibility that terrorists were responsible for this horrible crime due to the lack of a plausible motive and the unusual nature of the twin murder.
Although humorous, Pakistan Army Chief Gen. Syed Asim Munir’s bold and aggressive declaration that he would be willing to fight ten more battles over Kashmir should not be dismissed as a joke. However, his emotional outburst, which is a result of the Pakistan army’s repeated failures to seize control of J&K, offers a useful glimpse into the army’s stale mindset and its obstinate view that the military is the only viable solution to the Kashmir issue. Everyone on both sides of the Radcliffe Line who harbors the lofty “aman ki asha” (Hope for peace) delusion should be awakened by this realization.
According to reports published in Pakistani media on February 14, “security sources” claimed that “India has been attempting sabotage operations by transporting and deploying IEDs along the LoC” and that “the Indian military has a long history of unprovoked firing and subversive actions against unarmed civilians along the LoC.” This report asserts that “four Indian IEDs were recovered in the Battal Sector and Rawalakot between February 4 and 6” and cites an Indian army ceasefire violation on February 12 in support of its assertion that “Evidence suggests that since 2016 India has placed IEDs in 54 separate incidences along the LoC.”
This news report’s content and timing seem to be more of a defense of the Pakistani army’s recent provocative activities along the Line of Control than an accurate assessment of what happened. Furthermore, the information allegedly provided by unnamed “security sources” reeks of pure propaganda by accusing the Indian army of every possible crime, from smuggling weapons and drugs to false flag operations, fake encounters, and inciting unrest in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (PoJK) in an effort to “drive a wedge between the public and the military.”
The claim that “Pakistan has also provided evidence of these subversive activities to UN officials stationed in these regions” is the most intriguing aspect of the article in Pakistani media. The charter of the
But since nothing of this kind has occurred, it is clear that the alleged evidence that Islamabad allegedly provided to UNMOGIP was unreliable, and as a result, nothing was done about it. However, this is nothing new. Readers may remember that in May 2017, the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) media wing of the Pakistani army accused the Indian army of targeting a UNMOGIP vehicle in PoJK. However, Rawalpindi was exposed for his bluff when the UN Secretary General’s spokesperson stated unequivocally that “there is no evidence that the UNMOGIP military observers were targeted by the gunfire.”
Many people legitimately question whether the LoC truce will last given the Pakistani army’s increasing aggression, as is demonstrated by its repeated violations of the ceasefire and Gen. Munir’s remarks about launching ten wars for Kashmir. Although it is challenging to anticipate Rawalpindi’s reasoning because it occasionally defies reason, a basic overview of the history of the LoC ceasefire will undoubtedly aid in determining the solution.
Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the president of Pakistan at the time, first proposed a ceasefire in the LoC in August 2003. Three months later, New Delhi promptly reciprocated, and the ceasefire was formally declared. Fortunately, the ceasefire has held up despite sporadic episodes of cross-LoC firing. But even though many people believe that Gen. Musharraf and the Pakistani army brought about calm along the
It’s no secret that the Pakistani army enjoyed firing across the Line of Control until the 1980s since obtaining authorization for the Indian army to reply was a laborious procedure that was heavily entangled in red tape. People who had been on the LoC at the time would remember the common joke that Pakistani officials and even soldiers would make: “Your orders to fire come from New Delhi while we carry the order to fire in our pockets.” Fortunately, since then, the situation has altered, and the Indian army is now allowed to respond with prompt and proper retaliation.
The Pakistani army became aware that it was being targeted by this development. This is demonstrated by Rawalpindi’s repeated refusal to provide information about the casualties brought on by retaliation by
Isn’t it evident from this desperate attempt to hide facts that the Indian army’s retaliatory fire has been causing an abnormally high number of deaths in the Pakistani army? Therefore, it is clear that Gen. Musharraf’s 2003 ceasefire offer was not motivated by a sincere wish for peace but rather by an inevitable necessity brought on by the conflict’s extremely high attrition rates.
As a result, Rawalpindi is well aware that carrying on with this misadventure will come at a high cost in terms of army casualties, despite the fact that political pressures are currently forcing it to adopt provocative acts along the LoC. Therefore, the ceasefire is likely to last despite increased tensions.
Therefore, the Indian army needs to make sure that it keeps up with ceasefire violations and false flag operations like IED assaults and BAT raids.
