The Indian Air Force (IAF) has a significant capability gap in its combat fleet as it gets ready to phase out its aging MiG-21 fighters this month. The IAF’s operational strength will drop from 31 to 29 squadrons as a result of the retirement of these long-serving aircraft, significantly less than the sanctioned 42 squadrons thought to be required to counter a two-front threat from China and Pakistan.
India will be largely dependent on the Sukhoi Su-30MKI, the new TEJAS MK-1A, and two squadrons of Rafales by the end of the decade as other seasoned fighters, such the Jaguars, Mirage-2000s, and MiG-29s, will also leave service.
Despite being sophisticated 4.5-generation platforms, all three are not up to the standards for stealth and sensor fusion established by fifth-generation designs that are already widely used in the arsenals of superpowers. Though it is not anticipated to be introduced until 2035, the domestic Fifth-Generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) is making development. An urgent discussion about whether India should swiftly bring in foreign fifth-generation fighters as a stand-in capacity has been sparked by this delay in New Delhi.
The American F-35 Lightning II and the Russian Su-57 Felon are the only two international options left for India. Both aircraft have notable disadvantages in addition to special benefits. With the support of US global interoperability networks, the F-35 is the most extensively used fifth-generation fighter in the world.
It performs exceptionally well in joint-force integration, sensor fusion, and electronic warfare domination. Its value on the battlefield has been shown by operational experience in Syria and other theaters. Nevertheless, the F-35 has operational limitations and costs close to $100 million each aircraft.
Concerns about diminished capabilities in an export model are raised by Indian officials and academics who doubt Washington will deliver New Delhi the same variation used by US soldiers. America’s unwillingness to share sensitive technology, which would conflict with India’s Make in India and Atmanirbhar Bharat goals, is as significant.
Although there are fewer foreign purchasers for the Russian Su-57 Felon, India may benefit from cost savings, technology transfer, and co-production. If manufactured in India, the Su-57 could be more cost-effective than the F-35, with an estimated cost of $60 to 75 million per unit. The aircraft’s concentration on maneuverability, super-cruise, and multi-role capability makes it especially useful for offensive operations and long-range strikes.
In contrast to Western designs, the Su-57 program has had production delays, limited fleet deployment, even within Russia, and concerns regarding its stealth performance. Still, the circumstances seem favorable for possible collaboration given India’s long-standing defense relations with Moscow and its leaders’ recent diplomatic approach to Russia. From the standpoint of New Delhi, Russia’s readiness to share technology further increases its allure.
Sections of India’s security establishment support adding more Rafales to the current fleet in light of this strategic conundrum. The Rafale is a proven platform with superior avionics, a deep-penetration attack capability, and combat-proven performance, despite its high cost of almost $170 million per aircraft.
Adding more Rafale squadrons can improve uniformity in the IAF’s varied fleet, take advantage of economies of scale, and make use of the training and maintenance facilities already in place.
But France’s strict control over the aircraft’s source codes, including vital components like the mission computers and Thales AESA radar, presents a problem. This strengthens India’s reliance on Dassault by limiting its ability to independently upgrade systems and integrate indigenous weapons. The Rafale’s capabilities during the most recent Operation Sindoor, however, highlight its ongoing significance.
The IAF’s varied fleet’s inability to seamlessly fuse sensors is a bigger problem. In order to generate “kill chains” and a unified situational picture, modern air warfare depends on secure, real-time data linkages between fighters, ground st
ations, airborne warning systems, and satellitesThe lack of such sophisticated cross-platform cooperation, especially between Rafale and Su-30MKI squadrons, exposed serious weaknesses during Operation Sindoor against Pakistan. Platforms are unable to fully utilize their fighting capability in the absence of standardized data communication protocols.
Despite efforts to incorporate Indian armaments, like as Astra air-to-air missiles, onto Rafales, limitations on deeper software access continue to be a disadvantage. Experts contend that promises to fix these integration gaps must be included in any upcoming acquisitions, whether they are for the F-35, Su-57, or Rafale.
It is acknowledged in the IAF and policymaking circles that merely introducing fifth-generation systems devoid of detection countermeasures, network integration, and weaponry would not be sufficient. The interior bays of F-35s and Su-57s cannot accommodate the current indigenous missiles and precision weapons, necessitating the purchase of appropriate ammunition in addition to new aircraft.
Building layered air defense ecosystems—including improved surface-to-air missile systems, electronic warfare suites, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, hypersonic strike weapons like the BrahMos-2, and very high frequency (VHF) radars to monitor stealth aircraft—is also becoming more and more important. Analysts contend that in order to bridge aircraft shortages and shape India’s aerial deterrent, these complementary fields would be crucial.
One thing is unavoidable in spite of these conflicting priorities: India’s regional competitors are speeding up their covert acquisitions. Both the J-20 and the J-35 have been deployed by China, and Pakistan is anticipated to soon enter the fifth-generation market with a Chinese or Turkish stealth fighter. India is at a relative disadvantage as a result of this shifting neighborhood balance unless quick action is taken.
.There is growing agreement that, until the AMCA is prepared by the middle of the 1930s, India may need to employ a dual strategy: a limited introduction of fifth-generation fighters, such as the Su-57, through co-production, along with a higher quantity of 4.5-generation Rafales for immediate requirements.
Therefore, the choice in front of New Delhi involves more than just a comparison of aircraft costs or characteristics. Long-term force structuring, industrial self-reliance, technological accessibility, and geopolitics all influence this strategic decision.
It is imperative that the IAF modernize rapidly while striking a balance between cost, uniformity, and preparedness for the future. India’s air power equation for the next 20 years will be determined by the fifth-generation decision between the costly but operationally proven F-35, the affordable but unproven Su-57, and the dependable Rafale expansion. India is under time and geopolitical pressure, therefore it cannot afford to be late.
