Army Chief Gen. Upendra Dwivedi gave a detailed account of the operation and its aftermath at an event held at the Manekshaw Centre in New Delhi to commemorate the publication of Operation Sindoor: The Untold Story of India’s Deep Strikes Inside Pakistan, written by Lt Gen KJS Dhillon (Retd).
In addition to being a military account, Gen. Dwivedi emphasized that the book explored the deeper political-military aspects of the campaign, such as the government’s intentions, the clarity of orders, and what he called the “interpretation of full freedom” granted to the armed forces to carry out the operation.
In addition to being a prime example of India’s new strategic doctrine against terrorism—focused, methodical, and deliberate—the Army chief emphasized that Operation Sindoor had ramifications that went beyond tactical success and into the areas of political signaling and long-term deterence.
The tragic Pahalgam terror incident on April 22 prompted New Delhi to respond with a firm but measured response, which led to the beginning of Operation Sindoor. The armed forces launched extensive strikes against terrorist facilities within Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) starting in the early hours of May 7.
In order to eliminate terrorist launch pads, logistical centers, and camps that had long threatened security in Jammu and Kashmir, the Army, Air Force, and supporting units coordinated these strikes. Intense skirmishes ensued as Pakistan responded with its own offensives along the Line of Control (LoC).
Under the same operational cover, Indian soldiers retaliated with counteroffensives, sparking fierce combat that lasted almost four days. After both parties reached an agreement, the conflict was officially halted by the evening of May 10. However, Gen. Dwivedi made it apparent that the army’s decisions and the repercussions of the operation continued to have an impact well into mid-May.
This highlighted the action’s broader political-strategic aspect, which was not limited to the timetables of the battlefield.
In his speech, Gen. Dwivedi characterized Operation Sindoor as a pivotal example of India’s developing “new normal” in addressing terrorism, particularly cross-border terrorism. He claimed that the way the campaign was planned was unmistakable evidence of the country’s capacity to align “supra-strategic” goals with tactical realities.
Every military action was evaluated against its strategic and political ramifications, and decisions were continuously made about when to begin, when to halt, and how much force to calibrate. The Army chief compared this decision-making environment to playing a difficult game of chess in a thick fog, where timing, coordination, and judgment were crucial.
The maturity of India’s command structure during the battle was demonstrated by its capacity to strike a balance between central planning and decentralized implementation. He said that because each unit knew its responsibilities within the larger operational architecture, the military operated in “a rhythmic wave” over the course of the 88-hour operation, maintaining flawless synchronization without the need for laborious order cycles at every level.
Gen. Dwivedi went on to say that there were a lot of difficulties because of the gray-zone dynamics surrounding Operation Sindoor. The fine line between effective punishment and escalation control was exemplified by the long-term effects of every choice and even inaction.
India’s shift to a whole-of-nation approach, where military, political, and strategic guidance converged with clarity, was illustrated by the coordinated activities of the three services. As proof of the severity of India’s strikes, he cited accounts of Pakistani deaths along the Line of Control, including the revelation of soldiers who were posthumously recognized on their side.
The battle’s actual ground impact was further layered by anecdotal stories, like as intercepted communications requesting emergency retreats to Muzaffarabad.
The Army chief also emphasized the importance of media views and narrative management throughout the operation, arguing that Operation Sindoor offers important insights into how the public perceives, hypes, and reports wars.
He admitted that the book depicts not just the visible military actions but also the intangible aspects that are sometimes overlooked, such as the troops’ mental strain, sacrifices, emotions, and morale when they are regularly on the Line of Control.
According to him, these factors are frequently disregarded since those in uniform are unable to openly discuss them; for this reason, the author’s effort to bringing them to light was priceless. Despite the difficulty of distilling such diverse content into a single volume, he complimented Lt Gen Dhillon with encapsulating the harmony of political-military goals and operational reality in an understandable, approachable manner.
In the end, Gen. Dwivedi emphasized that Operation Sindoor ought to be regarded as a standard in India’s counterterrorism strategy. It demonstrated India’s ability to contain escalation and inflict significant costs on adversaries, demonstrating both national resolve against cross-border terrorism and clarity in strategic aim.
The operation, along with the book that chronicles it, is not only a historical record but also a roadmap for future civil-military cooperation, demonstrating how joint actions in grey-zone combat may be coordinated with political directions without sacrificing agility. In this way, the operation is not just a tale of military triumph but also a case study of contemporary political-military coordination and India’s changing strategy in the face of a precarious security environment.
