France’s Safran has emerged as a possible alternative partner with significantly higher strategic depth as a result of India’s continuous struggles to secure timely GE F414 engine deliveries for its TEJAS MK-1A and TEJAS MK-2 programs.
With the promise of 100% technology transfer—a crucial requirement that New Delhi has long sought but that American OEMs have never completely provided—Safran has presented a detailed plan to design and produce engines for the TEJAS MK-2 as well as the forthcoming AMCA.
In contrast to the GE arrangement, which restricts transfer to roughly 80%, such a transfer would include design blueprints, metallurgy, core technology know-how, and local production capabilities, allowing India to create a permanent ecosystem and lessen its reliance on foreign suppliers.
India urgently needs at least 99 engines to support the TEJAS MK-1A order of 83 aircraft and additional MK-2 timeframes, but only three engines have been delivered thus far due to major delays in the F414 supply chain.
At a time when tense political relations with Washington are affecting defense collaboration, New Delhi’s concerns have been exacerbated by certification obstacles and US export control constraints that have further impeded progress.
The Rafale agreement, the Scorpene submarines, and the continued cooperative development of the Shakti helicopter engine, on the other hand, are examples of how France has continuously matched its military-tech position with Indian needs.
This legitimacy is enhanced by Safran’s plan to establish a comprehensive Indian manufacturing ecosystem, which includes production facilities, testing facilities, and a repair/MRO hub. This plan also fits in well with India’s “Atmanirbhar Bharat” initiative.
Safran’s offer is particularly alluring from a strategic standpoint because it includes the AMCA, a fifth-generation stealth fighter whose survival largely rests on obtaining an advanced propulsion system, in addition to the TEJAS MK-2.
Should the agreement be signed, India will be able to base its future combat aircraft programs on domestic engines, guaranteeing independence in terms of export-oriented improvements, customization, and scalability.
Additionally, by 2026, Safran plans to open a Rafale engine maintenance and repair center in Hyderabad, lowering the risks associated with a “licence assembly only” approach and demonstrating France’s commitment to long-term industrial presence and job development in India.
Midstream horse swapping is still difficult, though. The GE F404 and F414 engines have been the foundation of the LCA ecosystem and a large portion of HAL’s present integration effort. Redesigning or delaying TEJAS MK-2 timelines could result from switching to Safran, which could have an impact on squadron inductions in the near future when the IAF is in dire need of fighters.
Since 100% technology transfer carries a premium and agreements must include lifecycle support, spare parts price, and guarantees against unilateral disruption, financial considerations will also be crucial.
In conclusion, Safran’s 100% transfer offer is a potentially pivotal step toward attaining total self-reliance in jet engine technology, even while GE’s 2023 F414 deal, which included an 80% technology transfer, anchored India’s immediate fighter programs.
Even if short-term integration issues continue, Safran might be a “perfect fit” for India’s long-term ambition given the geopolitical tension with the US and frequent delays.
The result may determine the course of the TEJAS MK-2 as well as the larger aerospace goals of AMCA and India over the next thirty years.
