Both nuclear-armed neighbours seem to be warily warming up to one another again, five years after the tragic encounter in the Galwan Valley that drastically changed India-China relations. The two countries’ most important diplomatic encounter since the 2020 standoff was the high-profile visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to India in August 2025, which was followed by Prime Minister Modi’s planned attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tianjin.
The issue still stands, though, as to whether this is a true reset or just another cycle in the decades-long pattern of freeze-thaw cycles in India-China relations. evaluated by India Today’s esteemed defence and strategic affairs reporter Sandeep Unnithan.
Twenty Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese servicemen were killed in the June 15, 2020, violent skirmish in Galwan Valley, which was the first fatal encounter between Indian and Chinese forces in forty-five years. This incident led to a thorough reevaluation of bilateral relations in addition to shattering the peace that had been upheld along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) for almost forty years.
Operation Snow Leopard, India’s retaliation, was initiated in late August 2020 following months of careful preparation. Indian forces gained considerable tactical and strategic advantages in ensuing discussions as a result of this strategic operation, which saw them seize important heights along the Kailash range on the southern bank of Pangong Lake. The operation drastically changed the dynamics of border management by demonstrating India’s readiness to shift from a purely defensive stance to one of strategic offence.
Both countries’ border infrastructure development accelerated at an unparalleled rate in the post-Galwan era. With 75 projects totalling ₹2,236 crore in 2024 alone, India has expanded its border roads program under the India-China Border Roads (ICBR) plan. Important advancements included the building of critical pathways linking different LAC patrol locations and the progress of the Shinku La tunnel project, which will eventually reach 15,800 feet and become the highest tunnel in the world.
China, on the other hand, made use of its advantages in border infrastructure. According to military observers, “China has built roads, bridges, tunnels and habitats along the entire LAC, from eastern Ladakh to Arunachal, over the last five years, enabling PLA troops to easily pull back 100-150km and then return in 2-3 hours” . India’s military planners continue to face difficulties as a result of this infrastructural disparity, and they must take these disparate mobilisation capacities into account when having de-escalation talks.
India continues to have clear advantages in mountain combat capabilities that stem from experience and acclimatisation. Indian soldiers have operational experience in hostile locations like as Siachen, the Thar Desert, and the northeastern jungles, and they receive a great deal of high-altitude training. China’s Western Theatre Command, which prioritises technology-driven, centralised operations, stands in stark contrast to the Indian Army’s Mountain Strike Corps, which prioritises terrain-specific fighting and a decentralised command structure.
After Galwan, the resolution process was complicated and advanced slowly. China initially benefited from territorial incursions in April and May 2020, but after India’s Operation Snow Leopard provided New Delhi bargaining power, things changed. Agreements were made at Galwan, Pangong Lake, and Gogra-Hot Springs between 2020 and 2021, while the final settlement at Depsang and Demchok wasn’t reached until October 2024.
Beyond simple territorial disputes, deeper issues were represented in the extended timescale. “Predominantly within the Indian claim line and seemingly permanently preventing our troops from accessing points to which they had unrestricted access before April 2020,” it was observed by analysts that the establishment of buffer zones during the 2020-21 disengagement processes caused “tremendous territorial setbacks to India.”
There seem to be several reasons behind China’s renewed interest in India. The economic argument is strong; even though China has a record trade deficit of $99.2 billion, India is China’s second-largest trading partner, with bilateral trade reaching $127.7 billion in 2024–2025. China’s interest in preserving and growing this profitable economic partnership is demonstrated by Wang Yi’s promises made during his visit in August 2025 about the supply of rare earths, fertilisers, and tunnel-boring equipment.
As it concentrates on other regional issues, especially Taiwan, China strategically aims to maintain stability along its Himalayan frontier. In an effort to restrict India’s involvement in programs like the Quad security alliance, Beijing also seeks to lessen India’s increasing dependence on the US and its partners.
India’s involvement seems to be impacted by shifting geopolitical conditions, especially the worsening ties with the US during President Trump’s second term. Significant economic pressure has been placed on New Delhi as a result of the 50% tariffs imposed on Indian exports, which include a 25% penalty for buying Russian oil. Given the timing of the diplomatic thaw, this “tariff tantrum” has unintentionally brought India closer to both China and Russia. Mutual respect, mutual sensitivity, and mutual interest—the “three mutuals” framework that was highlighted during Wang Yi’s visit—offer a diplomatic framework for handling fundamental issues and managing the relationship. India’s strategy demonstrates a realistic understanding that total disengagement from China is neither both strategically and economically viable.
The May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis, which resulted in Operation Sindoor, gave India-China relations a new dimension. China gave Pakistan minimal material and diplomatic support during this brief but severe conflict, which heightened India’s worries about the China-Pakistan relationship. But given how quickly the dispute was resolved and how India and China subsequently engaged diplomatically, it appears that Beijing favoured regional stability over aggression.
Ironically, President Trump’s assertive trade policies have accelerated the rapprochement between China and India. Analysts refer to India’s situation as a “prisoner’s dilemma” as a result of the punishing tariffs imposed on the country while keeping ties with China comparatively stable. This new dynamic is reflected in Chinese Ambassador to India Xu Feihong’s description of the United States as a “bully” and his appeal for India-China collaboration in opposition to American economic pressure.
Both countries now understand the importance of strategic autonomy in a more divided world, and this external pressure has boosted diplomatic contact between China and India.
In actuality, it seems that even though the current thaw is more significant than earlier cycles, it is still essentially delicate. The willingness of both countries to go beyond tactical engagement and confront structural problems that have hampered the relationship for decades will determine its success. Only when both parties realise that consistent cooperation, rather than sporadic conflict, serves their long-term interests will the freeze-thaw cycle be ultimately halted.
China and India are at a turning point five years after Galwan. For many years to come, the course they take will influence not only bilateral ties but also Asia’s larger geopolitical environment. Although the initial indications are cautiously encouraging, history indicates that sustained advancement would necessitate hitherto unheard-of levels of political resolve and strategic maturity on both sides.
