India’s Battle with Jet Engines: Four Decades of Unrealized Hopes

In 1986, the Kaveri engine program was launched with the audacious objective of providing indigenous power for India’s Light Combat Aircraft (TEJAS). The project, which had an initial budget of ₹382 crore and was expected to be finished by 1996, has grown into a huge financial endeavor that would cost more than ₹3,000 crore by 2025. From ₹382 crore in 1986 to ₹1,300 crore by 2004, then ₹2,000 crore by 2014, and finally ₹2,839 crore by 2016, the cost rise reveals a dismal tale. Without accomplishing its main goal, this amounts to a startling 642 percent budget overrun.

The Kaveri engine did not match the technological requirements for the TEJAS fighter aircraft, even after decades of development. Only 70–75 kN of wet thrust could be produced by the engine, which was insufficient for the 90+ kN needed for successful combat missions. The failure to meet international standards set by engines such as the General Electric F404 and SAFRAN’s M88 turbofan, weight issues that exceeded design parameters, dependability issues with overheating, and durability issues were among the technical hurdles.

The Kaveri project has experienced substantial change as of 2025. After years of research, the engine was cleared for inflight testing in December 2024, which was a significant milestone. For the DRDO Ghatak stealth Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicle (UCAV), a dry version of the Kaveri engine is currently under development. The thrust produced by this variant engine is between 49 and 51 kN, which is adequate for UAV applications but not enough for manned fighter aircraft.

The Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) has received the first two modules of the Kaveri derivative engine from Godrej Aerospace; six more modules are expected to be delivered in 2025. In September 2022, the business was awarded a contract to produce eight modules for the specialized 48 kN dry engine type intended for autonomous air vehicles.

Mastery of cutting-edge materials science is necessary for the creation of sophisticated jet engines, especially when it comes to designing parts that can endure harsh working environments. Because fighter jet engines run at temperatures higher than 1,500°C, single-crystal turbine blades, ceramic composites, and specialized nickel-based superalloys are required. Single-crystal turbine blades, which are essential for engine longevity and efficiency, have proven difficult for India to produce. Advanced casting methods, accurate cooling systems, and special coating materials are needed for these blades; top manufacturers like Rolls-Royce, GE Aviation, and Safran continue to closely preserve these innovations.

Successful jet engine development nations have strong ecosystems that include specialized suppliers, aerospace firms, and research institutes. Despite its growth, India’s aerospace industry lacks the extensive supply chain and industrial basis needed to manufacture the thousands of complex parts needed for contemporary jet engines. This shortage severely impedes the advancement of domestic growth by forcing reliance on imports for necessary components.

Complex testing facilities, including as wind tunnels, high-altitude test beds, and stress-testing labs, are necessary for the development of advanced engines. Due to India’s historical absence of these vital testing capabilities, engine testing has had to take place in foreign facilities, mostly in Russia. In addition to raising expenses, this reliance poses logistical challenges and possible security risks.

Industry analysis indicates that the Kaveri project had leadership problems that put institutional protection ahead of a candid evaluation of capabilities. According to reports, the GTRE leadership was less receptive to outside partnerships and candid assessments of technological constraints than the ADA’s successful Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) program, which was directed by Dr. Kota and welcomed cooperation with industry and academics. India first approached France’s SNECMA (now SAFRAN) for technical support in 2008, after 22 years of autonomous efforts, as a result of this restrictive strategy, which delayed important international collaborations.

As the TEJAS design changed, the project also suffered from constantly shifting specifications, which resulted in a 1,000 kg weight increase for the engine and greater thrust requirements that the Kaveri prototypes were unable to fulfill. Furthermore, private sector involvement was hindered by India’s license Raj system, as significant commercial partnerships didn’t start until 2020, three and a half decades after the project’s start.

The fact that just four or five nations have successfully built modern jet engines, with much of the technology being private and highly guarded, further emphasizes the industry’s exclusivity. Since no well-established manufacturer is ready to provide full technology transfer, the main route for entrants is indigenous development.

India has started forming strategic partnerships with other countries after realizing the limitations of independent development. The collaboration to jointly develop a 110-120 kN afterburning turbofan engine for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) with Safran of France is the most noteworthy development.

At the same time, India is concluding talks with GE Aerospace to produce F414 engines together for the TEJAS MK-2 program. This agreement covers 12 important technologies, such as single-crystal turbine blade machining and thermal coatings, and involves 80 percent technology transfer, a substantial increase from the 58 percent offered in 2012.

India’s four-decade battle to create its own jet engines is a reflection of the intricate relationship between institutional difficulties, strategic needs, and technological ambition. Despite not meeting its initial goals, the Kaveri project produced useful institutional learning and technology capabilities. A more practical strategy for reaching technological self-reliance is the move toward strategic alliances with well-established manufacturers while preserving intellectual property rights.

By showing that technological sovereignty necessitates not only national will and investment but also strategic partnerships, institutional reform, and a sustained dedication to creating comprehensive aerospace ecosystems, the Kaveri story serves as a springboard for future success rather than a failure. With the momentum it currently has and the lessons it has learnt, India is in a position to realize its aspirations for jet engines by taking a more practical and cooperative approach.

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