In the midst of difficulties in finalizing its long-pending joint production agreement with the United States, India is actively examining French fighter jet engines as an alternative to American engines.
Although it is unclear if the agreement will entail direct purchases or a localized joint production model, senior officials in New Delhi have revealed that talks are in on with France’s Safran SA. The change emphasizes how urgent it is for India to find propulsion options for its growing fighter fleet in light of the growing security threats.
by a co-production agreement approved by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, General Electric’s F-414 engines were initially supposed to power India’s next-generation indigenous fighter jet, the TEJAS MK-2.
This framework, which promised extensive supply chain integration and knowledge transfer, was hailed as a breakthrough in Indo-US cooperation. But over the past year, negotiations have slowed significantly, creating a crucial void in the schedule for increasing fighter production.
India is to replace its aging fleets of Dassault Mirage-2000s and SEPECAT Jaguars with around 200 cutting-edge fighters. Despite being in use, both kinds are under danger of being retired because of their antiquated technology, increased maintenance expenses, and incompatibility with competing platforms.
Since the new fighters are anticipated to serve as the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) mainstay in the 2030s, selecting an engine supplier is strategically crucial. The IAF’s already overburdened sanctioned squadron strength will be directly impacted by an adequate engine supply.
India’s aviation industry has always used Safran engines. The French firm has been involved in discussions with the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE) on the halted Kaveri engine program and powers the current fleet of Rafale fighter planes.
Thus, current confidence and technical cooperation might be strengthened by a possible Safran-India partnership. Following Rafale’s operational success and ensuing orders, Paris’ provision of power plants further solidifies its position as New Delhi’s top defense supplier.
The desperation of New Delhi is partly explained by the larger geopolitical backdrop. A near-war scenario including aerial fights, drone swarms, and missile strikes across their disputed border occurred earlier this year between India and Pakistan.
The episode emphasized the IAF’s strong reliance on foreign systems and shallow fleet depth. Therefore, accelerating the production of fighters is no longer just an industrial or diplomatic goal but also a national security need.
The situation is made more difficult by the fact that India-US relations are seeing the worst decline in decades. President Donald Trump’s harsh 50% tariffs on Indian exports have cast a shadow over the once-praised “strategic partnership.”
Though progress has been gradual, both countries are eager to strengthen their defense relations. Washington is still hoping to complete the production of the F-414 engines in India, and US delegations, including executives from Boeing and the Pentagon, are still traveling to New Delhi for high-level discussions. But the lack of progress has raised questions about long-term assurance.
An additional dimension is added by India’s advocacy for private sector involvement in fighter development. To support HAL’s public sector efforts, commercial defense companies have been authorized to design and develop modern combat aircraft for the first time.
As long as engine supplies are guaranteed, this access fosters an industrial ecology that could lead to competitiveness and international partnerships. Engines continue to be the most delicate and difficult component of fighter technology, and New Delhi’s choice of foreign partner will have a long-term impact on its aerospace industry.
At the end of the day, India must decide whether to rely on American propulsion technology under an unfulfilled promise of joint production or to turn to France, whose delivery history to India has been more seamless, from Mirage-2000s to Rafale fighters.
The competition is viewed by both Washington and Paris as a means of establishing stronger defense-industrial relations with the third-largest economy in Asia. India made the choice in order to ensure operational preparedness in an area that is becoming more hostile.
