Particularly because of its military ramifications, the changing relationship between the United States and Pakistan under Donald Trump’s second term is garnering fresh attention.
Paul Poast, an associate professor at the University of Chicago, claims that Washington’s approach to Islamabad is more about strategic geography than it is about forming a wide diplomatic alliance. Pakistan is a vital logistical base for American force projection in the region because it puts the United States close to two of its main adversaries, China and Iran.
Pakistan is now being reframed as a logistical enabler rather than just a political ally, Poast emphasized. Pakistan offers the United States a vital entry point for military resources due to its proximity to both China and Iran. He pointed out that having a physical American presence in Pakistan would enable quick deployment in the event of a crisis involving Beijing or Tehran and would also significantly reduce operational distances.
The Trump administration’s larger ideology, which prioritizes military power in U.S. policy, must also be considered when interpreting this cooperation. Poast cited the contentious executive order that changed the Department of Defense’s name to the Department of War in a symbolic manner. He contended that this change is a result of a purposeful narrative that emphasizes the importance of armed force in statecraft and governance. This perspective increases Pakistan’s usefulness in Washington’s priorities by viewing it more as a hard power logistical partner than as a diplomatic or development partner.
These actions align with the White House’s newfound interest in regaining vital assets, such the Bagram airbase in Afghanistan, according to Poast. According to him, advocating for Bagram makes sense because it would allow Pakistan to forward base nearer to Iran’s disputed nuclear facilities and China’s western borders. According to Washington, maintaining offensive capability and deterrence amid a changing global order requires control over such nodes.
Poast also cited Operation Midnight Hammer, the U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22, as proof that proximity counts. Pre-positioned bases, people, and regional alliances were essential to the attacks on Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. He contended that this operational approach supports the Trump administration’s interest in Pakistan since secure access makes future military operations possible and less politically limited.
The administration’s preference for direct interaction with Pakistan’s military establishment over its civilian government is another telling aspect. According to Poast, the Trump White House sees the Pakistani army as the actual facilitator of American military goals. Washington is demonstrating a practical, although transactional, approach by ignoring political protocol and giving priority to discussions with military chiefs such as Chief of Army Staff Asim Munir.
The recent meeting between President Trump, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, and COAS Munir in the Oval Office in Washington served as a reminder of this realignment. Transparency concerns are raised by the White House’s telling decision to withhold official images and video of the encounter.
On the other hand, a high-profile joint briefing was held after a meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan the same day. This revitalized alliance is sensitive, as evidenced by the low-key way the Pakistan summit was handled and how it was only publicized through official Pakistani sources.
According to Poast’s trajectory, cold strategic necessity is increasingly defining U.S.-Pakistan relations rather than shared political trust. Given the growing hostility between Beijing and Washington and the continuous hostilities with Tehran, Islamabad’s location makes it essential. However, Trump’s militarized narrative and opaque approach could exacerbate regional mistrust as well as internal Pakistani discourse.
