An significant internal discussion over the establishment of an Integrated Rocket Force (IRF) has been sparked by the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, which was India’s rapid and precisely guided missile attack against terror infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir in May 2025.
The successful operation, which was marked by the efficient use of BrahMos cruise missiles and other domestic precision bombs, has brought issues of force structure, joint service integration, and centralised missile command into the public eye.
A strategic change was signalled by Operation Sindoor, which demonstrated Indian missile capabilities independent of foreign platforms and logistics in addition to being a punitive strike in reaction to terrorism. The campaign exposed weaknesses in Pakistan’s and, consequently, China’s air defence systems and demonstrated the pivotal role of missiles like the BrahMos, which are used in tandem by the Army, Air Force, and Navy.
Pakistan’s response at the same time was to openly model its Army Rocket Force Command (ARFC) after China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF). By combining Pakistan’s conventional warhead missile capabilities, the ARFC intensifies the perception of a regional “missile arms race” and shifts strategic stability in the direction of increased escalation potential.
Across the three services, India now maintains its primary missile weapons, including the Pinaka multi-barrel rocket launcher, the BM-04, Pralay, Prithvi, and BrahMos. Operational fragmentation, shorter decision-making cycles, and inefficiencies in crisis and peacetime deterrence are the results of this compartmentalised distribution. Indian strategic circles advocate for a centralised, joint-service rocket force in light of China and Pakistan combining their own rocket forces under single commands. This force would:
Combine naval missile, aviation, and land forces for coordinated command and quick reaction.
Give strategic, theatrical, and tactical missile assets separate control to facilitate escalation management.
By offering a distinct and reliable conventional counterforce, you can strengthen deterrence.
Reduce redundancies and streamline development and procurement to increase cost-effectiveness and doctrinal clarity.
The main query is whether an Indian rocket force would be a combined service unit, reflecting the military forces’ ongoing “Theaterization” reforms. With inputs and operational control from all three traditional services, the planned IRF is envisioned as a tri-service command under the direction of the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), most likely led operationally by a Lieutenant General-equivalent.
The distinction between missiles that are assigned to the IRF for a more extensive, theater-level “strategic” impact (e.g., BrahMos, Pralay, BM-04) and those that stay with the services for “tactical” usage (e.g., Pinaka, short-range Prithvi) is still up for debate. The next-generation BM-04 (up to 1,500 km) and the Pralay missile, with its recently proven 500 km range and enhanced manoeuvrability, are prime examples of how tactical and strategic systems are becoming more and more entwined. With new variations reaching a range of 120 km and potentially 300 km projected, the Pinaka system itself is changing, posing issues with classification and centralised control.
As the recently announced Sudarshan Chakra Mission—similar to Israel’s Iron Dome but with a decidedly offensive bent—aims to integrate the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS) with an integrated, indigenous rocket force capable of both air defence and precision counter strikes, the Indian debate is developing concurrently. The goal of this integration is to establish smooth, real-time operational networks for “non-contact” warfare that provide cross-domain offensive and defensive reach.
Significant institutional adjustments will be required, including as asset transfers, updated operational doctrines, new command structures, and conformity to jointness reforms. The development of interoperable C4ISR technologies, training, and procurement will all be impacted by realignment. The issues of jurisdiction, interoperability, and operational control in peacetime vs warfare are still being debated from a strategic, doctrinal, and bureaucratic standpoint. As deeply ingrained service cultures and interests adapt to a highly integrated, joint-command paradigm, conflict may arise.
With the regional missile build-up and the lessons learnt from Operation Sindoor, India’s progress towards an Integrated Rocket Force is assuming significant new relevance in 2025. The goals are unmistakable: credible deterrence, efficient escalation control, rapid response capabilities, and a centralised leadership to guarantee unity.
Similar to India’s structural changes and increasing emphasis on self-reliance and sophisticated indigenous technical integration, the specific structure, service integration, and operational doctrine are still the subject of intense and heated high-level debate.
India is anticipated to take a dramatic step towards a joint-service, theater-level Rocket Force—integrated not only in name but also in technology, operations, and doctrine—as regional rivals modernise and consolidate their own rocket forces, ushering in a new age in South Asia’s military calculations.
